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1.5. KEY ELEMENTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE 




Public Enterprises (PEs) in Kosovo are of strategic importance for the country, employing 
about 14,000 workers and the impact on the economy over 20% of GDP over the past 5 years. 
Corporate Governance (CG) in Kosovo is a new concept and is in the process of continuous 
development and improvement. Government supported by the international community has 
made progress and has adopted laws based on best practices and international standards in 
general and the promotion of CG in particular, the challenge of enforcing the law in practice. 
The aim of the research is to analyse the mechanisms of CG and its legal framework in PE. CG 
in Kosovo as a result of the challenges of transition is closely related to the consolidation of 
the rule of law, ownership structure, as well as professional and institutional capacities. The 
basic hypothesis is that the weaknesses of the CG mechanisms affect the quality of the CG. 
Methodology: The research sample will be 17 PEs, 100% owned by the government. The 
research method will be combined primary data with secondary ones such as annual reports, 
analysis of the legal framework and mechanisms of CG. For primary data is a used survey with 
key actors in the CG. Results of the survey will identify strengths and weaknesses in the nature 
and enforcement mechanisms at CG and in this way to strengthen policy dialogue that will 
identify reform priorities that lead to improved performance CG and economic. 
 





Corporate Governance (CG) is one of the most debated issues in contemporary 
literature, and in the last decade has attracted and is receiving widespread attention 
across the globe, as well as in Kosovo. Empirical studies confirm that companies with 
good CG standard are valued higher in financial markets (McKinsey, 2002). 
Promoting CG has become a global movement developing wide array of standards, 
codes and criteria for evaluation. Countries and companies that have not addressed the 
problems of the CG are threatened to be left behind in the global race for capital. For 
investors, one of the most important aspects when making investment decisions is the 
level of implementation of the principles of CG (information disclosure, protection of 
shareholders rights and equal treatment of all shareholders and other stakeholders) and 
profit that provides return on their investment. PEs have multiple and contradictory 
objectives, influenced by excessive political interference and lack of transparency, 
considered the main problems facing PEs in Kosovo. 
 
Theories of Corporate Governance 
 
CG theme is becoming increasingly important on a global scale after the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997, Russian in 1998 and bankruptcy and scandals in the USA 
during 2001 and 2002 and the outbreak of the financial crisis that engulfed the global 
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corporate control market. Therefore, there is no opportunity to oversee the success of 
the company following the share price. Therefore, boards of directors, especially their 
structure, should have a key role in the CG of PE. Board of Directors (BD) is an 
instrument used by the government (shareholder) to influence the behaviour of PE 
management in Kosovo. 
 
Operation of the PEs 
 
PEs in Kosovo are of strategic importance for the country. PE provide vital services to 
people and employ about 14,000 workers, of whom 12.042 or 88% of men and only 
1,607 or 12% are women. PEs are incorporated in December 2005 and operate under 
the CG, based on the principles of the OECD for CG. Kosovo has a very large public 
sector which has significant impact on the economy of the country with an average of 
over 20% of GDP over the past 5 years (Ministry of Finance, SAA, pp. 142-143). PEs 
have a high level of bad debts, high technical and commercial losses, and face low 
collection level, so PE continue to burden the government budget, due to the inability 
to achieve the appropriate level of financial sustainability (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Financial support of the government for PE 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Economic Development, (PMUPE), PE performance reporting 2010 p. 10, 
2011 p. 21, and 2012, p. 17. 
 
Government policies for financial support to PE have a declining trend as a result of 
improved financial performance of companies. It is expected in the upcoming years 
that this government support would be even further reduced (PMUPE, 
2010/2011). This is very important in terms of expected negotiations for a Stabilization 
and Association Agreement (SAA). Likewise, the level of collection from customers 
for provided services is very small, especially in the waste sector where the collection 
rate is about 62%, in the water sector is about 68%, (PMUPE). 
 
External mechanisms of CG 
 
According to the law, a set of one-level model of governance (Anglo-American model) 
is provided to all PE, in which the impact of the internal control mechanisms prevails. 
External mechanisms include four factors: the market for corporate control, the legal 





economy in 2008 (GCGF, 2012). In response to these scandals OECD developed a set 
of standards and guidelines on CG. OECD Principles on CG were accepted in 1999 
and were reviewed in 2004. The OECD Principles are internationally recognized and 
treated by the entire CG framework. OECD Principles have served as a reference point 
for the development of a growing number of CG standards in different countries. After 
infamous scandals, many academic, expert and professional organizations presented 
their recommendations (Bech, 2005). Experiences show that the issue of salaries of 
managers and their relation to performance was at the centre of debates and literature 
from CG (Baker, 1988) and (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). OECD has developed 
guidelines on CG state enterprises, designed to meet the OECD principles on CG 
(OECD, 2005). OECD is seeking to push the implementation of the OECD principles 
on non-CG member countries by organizing round tables, such are organized in Asia, 
Latin America, Russia, Eurasia and Southeast Europe (OECD, 2003). PEs in Kosovo 
are government owned (Law No. 03/L-087, 2008), and may be subject to guidelines 
(OECD, 2005). PEs in Kosovo turned into corporations in 2005 where CG was 
adopted for the first time. Different authors define the concept of CG in different ways. 
Universally accepted definition of the term is derived from the ratio of CG Sir Adrian 
Cadbury, as the system by which the company is directed and controlled (Cadbury, 
1992). Internationally accepted definition is given (OECD, 1999, 2004). CG in Kosovo 
is a new concept and is in the process of continuous development and improvement. 
Kosovo government supported by international institutions operating in Kosovo: 
International Development Agency of the United States (USAID), IFC, World Bank 
(WB), OECD, etc., has shown a commitment to CG improved. The Government of 
Kosovo has achieved inter alia approved the Law on Business Organizations (Law No. 
02/L-123, 2007), the Law on PE (Law No. 03/L-087, 2008) which was amended later 
(Law No. 04/L-111, 2012), Code of Ethics and Corporate Governance for PE (2010), 
the amended and published in (July 2014), and has established, Policy and Monitoring 
Unit of PE (PMUPE). Since the CG implies a different set of relationships between 
management, board, shareholders and stakeholders, and establishing conditions for 
setting goals and means to achieve them, an important part of this process are the 
means to gain the control. CG mechanisms exist and work for this purpose.  
There are two main mechanisms of control: internal and external mechanisms. Internal 
control refers to the direct monitoring of the owners at work management 
discipline. External control occurs when other interest groups influence mechanisms in 
defining and achieving company goals. Internal mechanisms of control are: 1) The 
Board of Directors 2) Compensation of Management 3) Concentration of ownership 4) 
Relationships with stakeholders 5) Financial transparency and disclosure of relevant 
information (corporate reporting). External mechanisms include: 1) The market for 
corporate control 2) legal infrastructure 3) protection of small shareholders and 4) 
Conditions for competition. 
Internal mechanisms and their relationships are included in the CG of company's 
code. Foreign influence is observed mainly from the perspective of national level or 
from the perspective of belonging to a system of CG. Kosovo generally applies one-
level model, in which the impact of the internal control mechanisms prevail. One 
characteristic of PE is that the state ownership does not imply the existence of a 
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published a code of ethics in their web site and by all companies only (KOSTT JSC) 
has reported that it is implemented in practice this code. 
 
Internal Auditor 
Literature and many academics of CG argue that the internal audit function is an 
integral part of an effective system of CG. It is assumed that this is the first line of 
defense against misuse of company accountants. According to the OECD, the board of 
directors of an enterprise must necessarily define an internal audit function. Law sets 
internal audit as one of the senior most important officials of PE. Based on research, 
all PE (100%) have established committees of internal auditors and held on average of 
10÷13 meetings during the year, whereas more complex PE, such as KEK and PTK 
have teams of auditors, who enhance significantly the internal control (PMUPE, 
2011). The number of committees other than the audit committee established by 
enterprises is from 1÷6 (one to six), and now the new Code has reduced them to three 
with a temporary 6-months mandate with the possibility of extension by the BD. 
 
External Audit 
Under Article 33.1 of the Law on PE, each PE shall be subject to an annual external 
audit by an objective, independent, competent and qualified auditor. External audit is 
conducted by the Office of the Auditor General (OAG), or elected by the public 
enterprise through a selection process based on criteria and conditions set out in the 
Public Procurement Law (PPL). Every PE has the external audit completed for 2011, 
2012 and 2013. The reports resulted in opinions on the compatibility and consistency 
of financial statements and internal control processes with standards and legal 
requirements, and in comparison with previous years, recently there is a progress in the 
opinions of external auditors. 
 
Protecting the interests of shareholders 
 
That the system of corporate governance and best practices are still evolving, PE are 
still at risk due to non-transparency of operations, which reflect the position of 
shareholders as a whole, particularly the position of small shareholders. PE are owned 
by the government of Kosovo, and after the introduction of the private sector in these 
enterprises, it is necessary to ensure equality among shareholders, especially in matters 
of timely and accurate transactions etc. Law on PE, Article 13 stipulates that PE is 
subject to the same legal treatment as private enterprises. Law on PE, Article 12 
stipulates that all shareholders shall be treated equitably. According to the law, an 
equal market for all stakeholders is intended, and this is in conformity with the 
principles of the OECD (2005) and it poses a challenge for the government to 
implement it in the future. 
 
Internal mechanisms CG 
 
Internal mechanisms of control are: 1) The Board of Directors 2) Compensation of 
Management 3) Concentration of ownership 4) Relationships with stakeholders and 5) 






The market for controlling the corporate 
 
One of the most effective mechanisms for corporate control is the managers’ market, 
which forces managers to operate effectively because they can always be replaced by 
other more effective managers. In case of CG in PE of Kosovo, the role of the market 
for corporate control of the company is performed by BD. 
 
Legal and institutional basis  
 
Law on PE (Law No. 03/L-087, 2008), as amended and supplemented on 20.04.2012 
(Law No. 04/L-111) is a foundation for the form of management, reporting and 
ownership, for all PE’s. According to the law, the Government is obliged to supervise 
the management of these enterprises and report to Assembly on an annual basis.  
Kosovo's legislation is largely in line with the EU because of the considerable 
technical assistance provided by the United Nations (UN) and the EU in recent years 
(EBRD, 2013). However, the level of implementation of this legislation is less 
advanced. Some of these laws are:  
‐ Law (No. 02/L-123) on Business Organizations, September 27, 2007. 
‐ Law (No. 03/L-087) on Publicly Enterprises, June 13, 2008. 
‐ Law (No. 04/L-006) on Amending and Supplementing the Law No. 02/L-123 on 
Trade Associations, June 23, 2011. 
‐ Law (No. 04/L-111) on Amending and Supplementing the Law No. 03/L-087 on 
Public Enterprises, May 30, 2012. 
‐ Establishing of PMUPE 
‐ Code of Ethics and CG (June 2010), amended and revised (July 2014). 
‐ Instructions on becoming a director of PE (April 2010), and 
‐ Government’s Decision No. 01/119, date 13/03/2013, on remuneration of PE 
directors 
The means of this Law established a legal framework for governing the exercise of 
property rights in PE, CG of enterprises in accordance with internationally recognized 
principles of CG of PE’s, and effective reporting structures and responsibility to allow 
proper supervision of PE activities have been set. According to the Law on PE, Article 
4, item 4.1, all PE’s shall be organized as a joint stock company (JSC) in accordance 
with applicable laws on commercial companies (Law No. 02/L-123). According to the 
Law on PE, Article 40, paragraph 40.1 if an enterprise is or becomes less than 50% 
owned, directly or indirectly, by the Government, this enterprise is not a PE and the 
remaining shares are governed by the Law on Trade (Law No. 02/L-123). 
 
Code of Ethics and Corporate Governance 
Law on PE, Article 35 (35.1) states: Every PE shall prepare, adopt and implement a 
mandatory code of ethics and CG. According to the law, PMUPE has compiled and 
published the model code of ethics and CG which was distributed to all PE. This 
model establishes the code of ethics and standards of CG expected from PE, its 
employees, officers and directors. CG code in Kosovo was developed in cooperation 
with international institutions operating in Kosovo and technical support from the 
USAID and is in accordance with the law and largely meets international standards of 
CG as OECD principles. Above from the research shows that only 3 PEs have 
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Based on research findings, only 2 out of 17 PE distributed dividends for the 
government, while 15 other PE are not financially viable. During 2012, PTK has 
declared and distributed dividends to the shareholder, amounting to 45 million euro’s 
and 3.0 million euro’s KOSTT (PMUPE, July, 2013). 
 
Remuneration of PE Directors 
 
Remuneration along with bonuses represent one of the instruments of internal 
governance that are used more often and are generally assumed to be a good 
motivational tool used to align the interests of the owner (maximization of profit) with 
management interests . Law No. 04/L-111 on Amending and Supplementing the Law 
No. 03/L-087 PE Article 12 (1) limits the performance incentive remuneration which 
is determined after the annual audit of the financial statements and the publication of 
reports on the performance of the regulatory offices. 
This compensation (bonus) is now paid to directors, an amount up to 50% of the basic 
fee referred to in paragraph 2 of this article. Research findings show that the directors 
have received high bonuses without reaching the performance and also benefited from 
PE in other forms of use of vehicles, trips abroad and other illegal forms.  
Research results show that many BD of PE so far were part of, or related to 
politics. Research also shows that wages and salaries that the directors of these boards 
receive are very high compared with the average wage of the country. The 
government’s decision No. 01/119 dated 13.03.2013 that reverses previous decisions, 
adopt rules on the amount of compensation of PE board members. Research results 
points out that BD have illegally distributed bonuses before the end of calendar year 
and without assessing their performance. Members of the Board of PE in the past four 
years gained 3 million on behalf of salaries and bonuses (Newspaper Zëri, 
09.05.2014). 
Office of the Auditor General (OAG) in its report (August 2014) found that total 
compensation for members of the BD for the period 2009÷2012 was 2,439,710 
€. From this value for BD meetings was € 1,691,304, compensation for € 204.268 
audit committees, compensation for other committees and retroactive payment € 
528.368 payment of members of BD € 15.770, whereas bonuses allocated in this 
period were in the amount of € 1,207,139. Total compensation and bonuses for BD for 
the period 2009 ÷ 2012 was € 3,646,849. From the analysis of the OAG report it can 
be seen that the total payments to other committees from PE for the period 2009÷2012 
was € 528.368 (OAG, 2014). 
Directors, except representation in PE boards, are engaged in a primary work through 
private or public organizations. Except engagement as a regular member of the PE 
boards, participating in audit committees, directors are also engaged in several other 
committees within one month. The whole commitment of BD members in primary and 
secondary work indicates that boards may not be functional and cannot perform their 
job efficiently.  
The above statements on PE distributed bonuses by PE did not meet the criteria for 
measuring the long-term performance of PE developments in order to win the right to 




Composition of Board of Directors 
 
Law on PE (Law No. 03/L-087) defines the model as a one-tier board, known as the 
Anglo-American model. According to the Law on PE, Article 15, paragraph 15.1 the 
Board of Directors (BD) of a PE shall consist of five or seven directors. All directors, 
except one, shall be selected by the government and each such selected director shall 
have a 3-year term. The other director will be Executive Director (ED) of the PE and 
shall be selected by the Board of PE based on Article 21 of this Law. According to the 
Law on PE, Article 17, paragraph 17.2 all directors, except the ED, shall be 
independent; hence 82.5% of PE directors are independent and 17.5% ED. Article 37, 
paragraph 37.1 stipulates the establishment of PMUPE within the Ministry in order to 
support the Minister and the Government in exercising the responsibilities for PE 
which were conferred upon them by this law. PMUPE is responsible for organizing the 
training for directors of PE, and based on our research findings, such trainings, in 
collaboration with the International Development Agency of the United States 
(USAID) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC), were organized every year. 
The manner and criteria for selection of directors are defined by the same law. Some of 
these criteria are professional adaptability, political impartiality, conflict of interest and 
to not be prosecuted. So the issue of appointment of directors lies in the law. In 
practice, it turns out that the selection of the list of candidates that shall be voted on by 
the Assembly of Kosovo is non-transparent and politically influenced. Although 
defined by the law, the evaluation of the professionalism of the Board of PE still 
remains problematic because of the lack of transparency in the board nomination 
process.  
The findings show that no data for the professional and biography of BD members are 
published, but we indirectly learn that all members of BD possess a university 
degree. Referring to the Law, all BD mandate have expired in December 2011, even 
after the announcement of the two competitions in 2012, no selection of board took 
place because of political interference. Selection of the Board of PE remains disputed 
issue with the opposition, non-governmental organizations and civil society. Criticism 
had to do with lack of transparency, political appointments, professionalism in boards 
and high fees. The research revealed that PE boards are even used as a sector where 
political party militants can be hired. Hiring the party militants enables political parties 
to have more impact on these companies so they can push forward their policies. It 
also gives more employment opportunities for even more politicized people at the 
lower ranks of the company.  
In the past two years, BD were incomplete and non-functional, the situation at the 
beginning of 2015 shows that only two BD were selected, whereas other PE had no 
boards selected, and based on political agreement of the parties in power in January 
2015 a competition for selection of BD was publicly announced, yet no board was 
selected. Research also shows that the average number of BD sessions is 12.6, and the 
audit committee held 10 meetings in 2012 and 2013, above the European average 
which is 9.4 meetings per year (Heidrick and Struggles, 2011, p.26). 
In 17 PE analysed, BD counted 97 members, of whom six are women (6.19%) and 91 
men (93.81%). 
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Composition of Board of Directors 
 
Law on PE (Law No. 03/L-087) defines the model as a one-tier board, known as the 
Anglo-American model. According to the Law on PE, Article 15, paragraph 15.1 the 
Board of Directors (BD) of a PE shall consist of five or seven directors. All directors, 
except one, shall be selected by the government and each such selected director shall 
have a 3-year term. The other director will be Executive Director (ED) of the PE and 
shall be selected by the Board of PE based on Article 21 of this Law. According to the 
Law on PE, Article 17, paragraph 17.2 all directors, except the ED, shall be 
independent; hence 82.5% of PE directors are independent and 17.5% ED. Article 37, 
paragraph 37.1 stipulates the establishment of PMUPE within the Ministry in order to 
support the Minister and the Government in exercising the responsibilities for PE 
which were conferred upon them by this law. PMUPE is responsible for organizing the 
training for directors of PE, and based on our research findings, such trainings, in 
collaboration with the International Development Agency of the United States 
(USAID) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC), were organized every year. 
The manner and criteria for selection of directors are defined by the same law. Some of 
these criteria are professional adaptability, political impartiality, conflict of interest and 
to not be prosecuted. So the issue of appointment of directors lies in the law. In 
practice, it turns out that the selection of the list of candidates that shall be voted on by 
the Assembly of Kosovo is non-transparent and politically influenced. Although 
defined by the law, the evaluation of the professionalism of the Board of PE still 
remains problematic because of the lack of transparency in the board nomination 
process.  
The findings show that no data for the professional and biography of BD members are 
published, but we indirectly learn that all members of BD possess a university 
degree. Referring to the Law, all BD mandate have expired in December 2011, even 
after the announcement of the two competitions in 2012, no selection of board took 
place because of political interference. Selection of the Board of PE remains disputed 
issue with the opposition, non-governmental organizations and civil society. Criticism 
had to do with lack of transparency, political appointments, professionalism in boards 
and high fees. The research revealed that PE boards are even used as a sector where 
political party militants can be hired. Hiring the party militants enables political parties 
to have more impact on these companies so they can push forward their policies. It 
also gives more employment opportunities for even more politicized people at the 
lower ranks of the company.  
In the past two years, BD were incomplete and non-functional, the situation at the 
beginning of 2015 shows that only two BD were selected, whereas other PE had no 
boards selected, and based on political agreement of the parties in power in January 
2015 a competition for selection of BD was publicly announced, yet no board was 
selected. Research also shows that the average number of BD sessions is 12.6, and the 
audit committee held 10 meetings in 2012 and 2013, above the European average 
which is 9.4 meetings per year (Heidrick and Struggles, 2011, p.26). 
In 17 PE analysed, BD counted 97 members, of whom six are women (6.19%) and 91 
men (93.81%). 
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Relations with interest groups 
 
PE should recognize the importance of relations with interest groups, for the sound and 
financially stable companies. State ownership policy should fully recognize the PE 
responsibilities towards stakeholders and lay down demands that they report on 
relations with other stakeholders. It is necessary for PE to continue active cooperation 
with all stakeholders in order to create jobs, prosperity and the preservation of 
financial stability of the company. 
 
Reports based on Law on PE 
 
The existence of PE website and quality online reporting greatly facilitates the access 
to existing and potential investors with relevant and timely information for 
companies. The law obliges all PE to submit every 3 months certain reports. Based on 
research, from the total number of 17 PE analysed, only 13 of them possess internet 
website. It is also noted that the maintenance of existing web-pages is 
insufficient. Results of the survey show that there are few relevant information to 
current and potential shareholders and other interested parties. 
From 17 PE that were analysed, only 9 have published: mission, vision, annual 
business plan, organizational chart, financial statements and independent auditors' 
report, etc., for 2010-2013 periods on their website. PMUPE has published annual 
reports for the 17 PE and the external auditor's report on its website for the year 2010-
2013 for all PE but this site is poorly maintained and not all the reports can be opened, 
whereas in 2014 there is no reporting conducted, although the law requires 75 days 
after the end of the calendar year to report to the Assembly. The above delays in 
annual reports and insufficient information on the websites of companies and their non 




Among the achievements of the Kosovo government worth of highlighting is the 
provision of legal and institutional framework, which largely meet the standards and 
principles of the OECD and other international experiences, but their implementation 
in practice remains a challenge. Weak enforcement of legal provisions and non-
qualitative supervision of PE activity by the shareholder shows that there are delays in 
the delivery of quality services to citizens. It should reflect the positive effects of 
greater transparency and greater public access to information on the operation of the 
PE. As in other countries, in Kosovo effective governance of PE is a difficult and 
complex matter. Research analysis shows that the government as a shareholder is not 
that much interested to improve the performance of PE and political interference are 
highly influencing the appointment of directors and management. PE are responsible 
for the procurement of goods and services that are in fact the most corrupted practices 
in terms of tenders abuses by certain political groups and the governors who, beyond a 
shadow of a doubt, are a cancer to the health of PE in Kosovo. Political appointments 
of unqualified and inexperienced people ate the boards and management, but supported 
by certain political groups, weaken the quality of the CG. CG in PE of Kosovo has 




incentive compensation. The provided statements show that only four PE have partly 
met the criteria. 
PMUPE in its website published a consolidated annual statement on PE for 2012. The 
analysis above shows that only three PE did not distribute bonuses for BD. 
 
Concentration of ownership in PE 
 
The main hypothesis that prevails in nowadays literature on the CG is that corporate 
profitability is positively associated with the concentration of ownership. Although the 
concentration of ownership of large shareholders is considered a mechanism for 
reducing conflict between shareholders and management, it can be a potential source 
of conflict of interest between large and small shareholders (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 2000).  
However, empirical evidence about the relationship between concentrated ownership 
and financial performance of the companies is unclear and unconvincing in different 
markets within the same market. In transition economies, characterized by 
underdeveloped capital markets, to understand the effects of ownership structure, the 
authors start off from the general assumption that the private property leads to 
improved performance (Frydman, Gray, Hessel and Rapaczynski, 1999).  
In the case of Kosovo, the ownership structure of PE of Kosovo is focused on only one 
shareholder (the government, as 100% shareholder), which does not imply the 
existence of the market for corporate control, and therefore reflects the composition of 
BD which has a key role in CG of PE. PE in Kosovo continues to have low 
performance and delay in providing quality services to citizens. PE have been 
consistently followed by a series of negative phenomena such as mismanagement, 
corruption, weak and non-professional boards, political interference, non-transparency, 
having too many staffers and militants of rulers, budget deficit, etc. This made PE not 
attractive to investors. Kosovo's government has madeit clear to the introduction of the 
private sector in these sectors. Privatization of state-owned shares in certain PE has 
moved very slowly, which at the current level of their management and financial 
sustainability means relatively low quality of CG of PE in Kosovo. Moreover, it is 
rightly to assert that the best solution for PE in Kosovo is privatization and most 
effective way to improve the performance of these PE.  
Pristina International Airport (PIA) was granted on concession for 20 years by the 
Government of Kosovo for the first time in 2010. Also the government of Kosovo in 
June 2012 awarded the company Limak and Calik to privatize the Distribution and 
Electricity Supply (KEDS) priced 26.3 million, whose ownership was transferred in 
May 2013. This process was not opposed with regard to transparency from the 
opposition, non-governmental organizations and the public at large. 
The government failed several times in succession in the sale of 75% PTK shares stake 
and in enhancing new energy capacities. Research findings show that BD are 
politically influenced by the shareholders (the government) and exert a positive and 
significant effect on employment, while they negatively affect the performance of the 
PE. However, the practice confirms the existence of direct political interests that 
undermine the efforts of the Board of PE to achieve these objectives. 
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The Standardized Work (SW) means to create wasteless process as much as possible and 
create the document of the current best practice to maintain the developed status. SW is the 
baseline for KAIZEN. As the standard is improved, the new standard becomes the baseline for 
further improvements, and so on. Improving standardized work is a never-ending process. In 
this 
Our research shows how can be combined the 5S and standard work. By the parallel 
implementation of the 5S and Standard Work, the economic benefits are coming earlier. 
 
Keywords: lean, standard work, 5S 
 
 
The Lean Concept origin 
 
All business-oriented company’s primary goal is to gain profit even if it is a production 
or service provider company. Either the micro or multinational companies act in a 
characteristically and locally specialized but continuously changing business 
environment. Despite that, there is an open market by globalization for everyone, the 
immediate local economic, political, social, geographical, energetic, environmental 
factors strongly influence and define the market share. In one hand, the profitability of 
a company lays down the ability of effectiveness of the company’s internal business 
processes and the adaptation capability to the external business environment, during 
the companies different lifecycle stages (Illés et al., 2015). On the other hand, this 
means that how much value is created during the transformation process and how 
much non-value added activity and waste is hidden in the value stream of the business. 
Waste means all activities that will not add value during the transformation process 
and service. The value added and waste ratio strongly define the income flow and 
quality as well as the costs. The costs directly decrease the profit. (Illés and Szuda, 
2015; Al-zaidi and Dunay, 2015) 
This thinking has roots in Arsenal of Venice in the 1450s at starting of mass 
production. This ship factory was capable of producing one fully equipped merchant or 
military vessel per day, whereas production of similar sized and featured ships 
elsewhere in Europe took several months. At the Arsenal, the modern concepts of 
standardized parts, assembly-line production, specialized work groups, and vertical 
integration were anticipated. The modern era’s mass production systems started to 
develop in 1890s. In 1905, Henry Ford together with his chief construction and 
production inventor József Galamb designed the mobile assembly line for the Ford T-
Model. In 1937 in Japan, the Toyota Motor Corporation was founded by Kiichiro 





quality of the board of directors, whose members should be professionally trained, 
have better information about the company's operations, and should have greater 
independence and not be subject to political influence, because strengthening the role 
of the board of directors would allow high efficiency and win the company's 
reputation. These results reflect that the concept of CG in Kosovo is in the beginning 
stage. It is evolving and not well understood or applied. Research results show the 
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